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Abstract I outline Brandom’s theory of de re and de dicto belief ascriptions,
which plays a central role in Brandom’s overall theory of linguistic communication,
and show that this theory offers a surprising, new response to Burge’s (Midwest
Stud 6:73–121, 1979) argument for social externalism. However, while this
response is in principle available from the perspective of Brandom’s theory of belief
ascription in abstraction from his wider theoretical enterprise, it ceases to be
available from this perspective in the wider context of his inferential role semantics
and his doctrines of scorekeeping and of the expressive role of belief ascriptions in
discourse. In this wider context, Brandom’s theory of belief ascriptions implies that
Burge’s argument trivially fails to have the disquieting implications for psycho-
logical explanations that it is widely taken to have. Yet since this is not trivially so,
Brandom’s theory apparently provides a false picture of our practice of interpreting
belief ascriptions. I then argue that Brandom might as well accept the alternative
picture of interpreting belief ascriptions that Burge’s argument presupposes: even in
the context of his overall project, Brandom’s take on our practice of interpreting
them does not afford belief ascriptions with the discursive significance Brandom
claims they have.
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ascriptions  Semantic holism  Linguistic communication  Interpretation 
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(I) Between the late-60s and the 80s, in the context of the great debates about
reference and singular thought, the contrast between de re and de dicto belief
ascriptions (the de re–de dicto contrast, for short) was subject to intense discussion.1
It was argued that de re ascriptions demarcate beliefs of a special type that relate
with particular intimacy to their referents. Today most people accept one or another
version of this claim. More recently, Robert Brandom has looked at the de re–de
dicto contrast from a different angle. While denying that de re ascriptions demarcate
beliefs of a special type, he still argues that the de re–de dicto contrast is deeply
significant: the contrast allows us to express—make explicit—our differences in
linguistic understanding to each other in discourse.2
I shall outline the relevant aspects of Brandom’s theory of the de re–de dicto contrast
and show that this theory offers a surprising new perspective on Tyler Burge’s original
(1979) argument for social externalism. From this perspective, Burge’s argument
establishes externalism but straightforwardly fails to have the disquieting conse-
quences for psychological explanations that it is widely taken to have. Yet while this
perspective is in principle available if we accept Brandom’s theory of belief ascriptions
in isolation from the context of his larger theoretical enterprise—in particular, his
holistic semantics and his theory of successful communication (his theory of
scorekeeping)—it implies in this context that Burge’s argument trivially fails to have
these disquieting seeming consequences. And since this is not trivially so, Brandom’s
theory, in this context, is mistaken: it provides a false picture of our practice of
interpreting belief ascriptions. Moreover, I shall argue that even in this wider context
Brandom’s theory does not, after all, afford the de re–de dicto contrast with the
discursive significance Brandom claims it has: whether we interpret belief ascriptions
as Brandom proposes or in accordance with the standard picture presupposed by
Burge’s argument, they fail to allows us to make differences in linguistic understanding
explicit to each other in discourse. Accordingly, Brandom might as well accept this
standard picture: the larger context of his overall enterprise does not provide him with
any special theoretical or prudential reason for favoring his proposed alternative take on
the de re–de dicto contrast over the standard picture Burge presupposes.
(II) The de re–de dicto contrast is often introduced as a contrast in logical form of
belief ascriptions, revealing belief as either a two-place or a three-place relation.3
Take the unregimented ascription
(1) Jones believes that water quenches thirst immediately
The surface grammar of (1) disguises a systematic ambiguity in logical form, which
the analyses of (1) as either de dicto or de re reveal. Analyzed de dicto, (1) has the form
1 I use the term ‘de re–de dicto contrast’ here exclusively to mark a difference between two types of
belief ascriptions, not between two types of beliefs (so-called de re and de dicto beliefs).
2 Brandom does not deny that there are so-called de re beliefs—he calls them epistemically strong. He
only denies that de re belief ascriptions classify these beliefs. According to him, every belief is, in
principle, ascribable both de dicto and de re (e.g. Brandom 1994, p. 526). Brandom develops this theory
of belief ascriptions most fully in his 1994: Chaps. 8 and 9. For further discussion, cf. especially Brandom
(2002, Chap. 3; 2007, pp. 663–670; 2011, pp. 210–214).
3 For a distinction between syntactic versus semantic de re ascriptions cf. e.g. McKinsey (1999, p. 521).
212 R. Loeffler
123
(2) Jones believes that water quenches thirst immediately
or
(20) Believes \Jones, that water quenches thirst immediately[
Thus analyzed, (1) specifies, in its oblique that-clause, a complete (truth-valued)
propositional content or dictum—that water quenches thirst immediately—and
represents Jones as standing in a two-place belief relation to that dictum.4 Analyzed
de re, (1) has the form
(3) Jones believes of water that it quenches thirst immediately
or
(30) Believes \Jones, water, that Uwater quenches thirst immediately[
So analyzed, (1) represents Jones as standing in a three-place belief relation to, first,
what per se appears to be the incomplete content of an open sentence (that it
quenches thirst immediately or that U quenches thirst immediately), and, second, the
natural kind water. Given the anaphoric relation between the pronoun ‘it’ and the
term ‘water’ in (3), (1), thus analyzed, moreover represents water as the referent (the
res) of the ascribed belief.
In general, de dicto ascriptions represent believers as standing in two-place belief
relations to complete (propositional) contents, whereas de re ascriptions represent
believers as standing in three-place belief relations to, on the one hand, incomplete
(or at least incompletely specified) contents and, on the other hand, the individuals,
properties, or kinds that these contents are about.
Cognitive verbs like ‘believes that’ prima facie create intensional contexts—
contexts in which the substitution of co-extensional terms for each other does not
necessarily preserve the truth-value of the overall ascription. Accordingly, a well-
known substitutional test indicates whether ordinary belief ascriptions should be
analyzed de dicto or de re (e.g. Quine 1956, pp. 181–182; Kaplan 1968,
pp. 179–180; Burge 1977, pp. 341–342). Substitute into an ordinary ascription,
such as (1), any co-extensional term for a term that, according to surface grammar,
occurs in oblique context (for example, substitute ‘H2O’ for ‘water’ into (1)). If the
substitution does prima facie not necessarily preserve the truth-value of the
ascription, the substituted-for expression (‘water’) occurs indeed in oblique context
at the level of logical form, and the original ascription is de dicto. Otherwise, it is de
re.
This way of introducing the de re–de dicto contrast is contentious in various
respects, and also potentially at variance with some of Brandom’s views on belief
ascriptions.5 Yet, these points of contention and potential variance have no bearing
on the argument I wish to make.
4 I shall use Quine’s terms ‘oblique’ versus ‘transparent’ to refer to contexts that, at the level of logical
form, are inside versus outside the that-clause of belief ascriptions (cf. Quine 1960, pp. 144–151).
5 For example, some (e.g. Cresswell 1985; Bach 1987, Chap. 10) argue against the systematic ambiguity
of sentences like (1). Moreover, the relational analysis of de dicto and de re belief ascriptions is
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(III) Brandom develops his theory of the de re–de dicto contrast in the context of
an elaborate semantic theory—a version of inferential role semantics—and a
correlative theory of linguistic communication. I outline the relevant aspects of
these theories in this and the next two sections.
Very briefly, Brandom assumes that a web of norms of material inference and
material incompatibility, relating any atomic assertoric sentence to some (but not
all) other atomic assertoric sentences of the language, partially constitutes the
meaning of these sentences.6 For instance, the meaning of the English sentences
(4) Water quenches thirst immediately
and
(5) H2O quenches thirst immediately
is partially constituted by two norms of inference, one licensing the material
inference from (4) to (5) and another one licensing the material inference from (5) to
(4). Moreover, the meaning of (4) and
(6) Water stirs thirst immediately
is partially constituted by a norm certifying the mutual material incompatibility of
(4) and (6).7
Brandom extends this material inferentialist approach to (atomic assertoric)
sentence meaning to a substitutional approach to (non-logical singular and general)
term meaning. According to this extension, certain norms governing the substitution
of terms for other terms in the generation of material inferences and material
incompatibilities constitute the meaning of these terms. For example, the meaning
of the English terms ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ is partially constituted by a norm according
to which, for every occurrence of ‘water’ in an extensional context, substituting
‘H2O’ for that occurrence generates a valid material inference, and by another norm
according to which, for every occurrence of ‘H2O’ in an extensional context,
substituting ‘water’ for that occurrence generates a valid material inference.
(Treating the two norms as a single conjunctive one, we may speak here of a single
Footnote 5 continued
contentious. For an alternative view cf. e.g. McKinsey (1999). Furthermore, assuming the relational
analysis, the claim that one of the relata of belief is a (complete or incomplete) content, rather than, say, a
(closed or open) sentence or the linguistic meaning of such a sentence, is potentially controversial. Again,
Brandom regards the cognitive verb ‘believes that’ as an expressive locution and he may, accordingly,
deny that it denotes any relation(s) (e.g. Brandom 1994, pp. 498–499). Finally, he prefers to supplant talk
about belief with talk about (assertional) commitment (e.g. Brandom 1994, pp. 195–196, 596; 2000a,
p. 174).
6 ‘Partially’, because certain further norms determining, on the one hand, the proper use of an atomic
assertoric sentence under certain non-linguistic observable circumstances (language entries) and, on the
other hand, proprieties of non-linguistic actions (language exits) in the context of endorsements of the
sentence also partially constitute the meaning of the sentence, according to Brandom.
7 ‘Material’ in the sense that these inferences are valid, and these incompatibilities obtain, independently
of sentences containing logical (formal) vocabulary. Brandom insists that the inference from (4) to (5), for
example, is not enthymematic, that is, that it is valid independently of, say, the premise ‘If water quenches
thirst then H2O quenches thirst’. And similarly for the incompatibility between (4) and (6).
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symmetric substitution-inferential norm, governing the pair of terms ‘water’ and
‘H2O.’) Similarly, the meaning of the general terms ‘x quenches thirst immediately’
and ‘x stirs thirst immediately’ is constituted partially by a norm according to
which, for every occurrence of ‘x quenches thirst immediately’ in an extensional
context, substituting the term ‘x stirs thirst immediately’ for that occurrence
generates a material incompatibility.
In general, an ordered pair of (non-logical singular or general) terms\‘A’, ‘B’[
is governed by what might be called a substitution-inferential norm iff every two
sentences ‘___A___’ and ‘___B___’ (where ‘A’ and ‘B’ may occur several times in
the respective sentences), such that (a) the latter sentence may be generated from the
former in a single step by substituting ‘B’ for some occurrence(s) of ‘A’, and (b) the
context(s) in which the substitution(s) of ‘B’ for ‘A’ take place are extensional, are
in relation of valid material inference (with ‘___A___’ as the premise and
‘___B___’ as the conclusion). Similarly, an ordered pair of (non-logical singular or
general) terms \‘A’, ‘C’[ is governed by what might be called a substitution-
incompatibility norm iff every two sentences ‘___A___’ and ‘___C___’ (where ‘A’
and ‘C’ may occur several times in the respective sentences), such that (a) the latter
sentence may be generated from the former in a single step by substituting ‘C’ for
some occurrence(s) of ‘A’, and (b) the context(s) in which the substitution(s) of ‘C’
for ‘A’ take place are extensional, are materially incompatible. Substitution-
inferential and substitution-incompatibility norms (let’s call them substitution
norms) thus codify patterns of material inference and material incompatibility.
Brandom’s semantic thesis is that the meaning of each non-logical term is partially
constituted by all the substitution norms relating the term to other terms (of the same
syntactic category) of the same language.8
The details of this semantic theory do not matter for present purposes. For
argument’s sake, let’s accept this theory without further discussion.
(IV) The substitution norms governing the terms of a language bind the speakers
of the language. In light of them, speakers are obliged to accept in practice various
substitution inferences from, and to recognize in practice various substitution
incompatibilities with, the statements they make. Brandom calls such semantic
obligations the substitutional commitments a speaker adopts in making a statement.
Substitutional commitments are a type of normative status a speaker acquires in
making a statement—a standard in light of which his subsequent linguistic and non-
linguistic behavior is assessable as correct or incorrect.9
The notion of a substitutional commitment links Brandom’s theory of meaning to
his theory of linguistic understanding. According to Brandom, a speaker’s linguistic
understanding—interpretation—of a (non-logical singular or general) term consists
in part in the substitutional commitments the speaker acknowledges regarding the
term, that is, in her treatment in practice of the term as governed by certain
8 For the ‘partially’ cf. Fn. 6.
9 The speaker also adopts another type of semantic normative status by saying something: semantic
entitlements. What he says permits him to make various further, materially compatible statements.
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substitution norms.10 The speaker understands the term in a certain way in part
because, based on what she takes the substitution norms governing the term to be,
she is disposed to draw various (valid or invalid) inferences from statements in
which the term occurs in extensional position and disposed to treat (rightly or
wrongly) these statements as incompatible with various other sentences, reachable
by substituting for the term in question certain other terms of the same syntactic
category.11
Brandom thinks of a speaker’s acknowledged substitutional commitments as
normative attitudes, taken by the speaker, that play a causal role in the speaker’s
cognitive etiology. Drawing inferences is a causal process and treating pairs of
statements as mutually incompatible is a causally efficacious state. Accordingly, qua
dispositions to draw inferences and to treat pairs of statements as incompatible,
acknowledged substitution-inferential and substitution-incompatibility commitments
are part of the natural world of cause and effect (e.g. Brandom 1994, pp. 260–261;
2007, p. 669). However, Brandom denies that a purely non-normative (and, in this
sense, naturalistic) account of acknowledged substitutional commitments can be
given—for example, that acknowledged substitutional commitments reduce to
dispositions to verbal behavior. On the one hand, acknowledging substitutional
commitments intrinsically involves being sensitive to the semantic normative
dimension of the terms in question, and Brandom denies that such sensitivity is fully
explainable in non-normative terms (Brandom 1994, p. 33). On the other hand,
Brandom’s central ‘‘pragmatist’’ contention is that constellations of acknowledged
substitutional commitments and other normative attitudes across speakers somehow
institute or create the semantic norms themselves. And according to Brandom, these
normative attitudes could not have this norm-instituting power if they reduced to
purely natural states: the pragmatic theory of language use, characterizing these norm-
instituting attitudes, must itself be an irreducibly normative, rather than merely
descriptive, pragmatics (e.g. Brandom 1994, pp. xii–xiii).
Brandom sometimes calls a speaker’s interpretation of a term at a time—
constituted in part by the set of substitutional commitments she acknowledges
regarding the term at that time—her conception of the term’s meaning at that time
(e.g. Brandom 2007, p. 669). It is the speaker’s grasp of the term’s meaning at that
time. Yet of course, such interpretation may not, and usually is not, fully faithful to
the objective meaning of the term. The term’s objective meaning—which Brandom
often calls the concept the speaker expresses by using the term (e.g. Brandom 2007,
pp. 669–670)—is constituted in part by the objective substitutional norms governing
the term, that is, by the substitutional commitments the speaker in fact adopts when
using the term, and the speaker’s acknowledged substitutional commitments may
10 ‘Implicitly in practice’ in the sense that the speaker does not have to be able to articulate (make
explicit) what she takes these purported substitutional norms to be, but only needs to be able to show her
sensitivity to them by using the terms accordingly in discourse.
11 ‘In part’, because her understanding of the term also partially consists in her propensities to endorse
statements involving the term in response to perceptual inputs (language entries) and to act non-




fail to capture some of these norms (her understanding may be incomplete) or she
may acknowledge substitutional commitments to which no substitutional norm
corresponds (her understanding may be deviant), or both.
(V) This last observation invites a version of the challenge, familiar from Fodor’s
and LePore’s work, about the compatibility of semantic holism, such as Brandom’s
inferential role semantics and its correlative, holistic theory of linguistic
understanding, with the possibility of successful linguistic communication (e.g.
Fodor and LePore 1992). Given holism, any two speakers’ interpretations of any
(non-logical) term usually differ in certain respects at any time. Couched in
Brandom’s terms, the two speakers usually acknowledge different sets of
substitutional commitments regarding the term at the time. It follows that the
speakers usually understand all the sentences involving the term in different ways.
Thus, they usually miscommunicate when they use these sentences: instead of
sharing an understanding of what is said (and thus agreeing or disagreeing about its
truth-value), the speakers simply talk past each other. Yet we do in fact
communicate successfully most of the time. Therefore, any theory of linguistic
understanding, such as Brandom’s, that implies that we don’t is false.12
(VI) We do not need to assess the merits of this challenge here. What matters is
that Brandom takes the challenge very seriously and crafts, partially in reply to it, an
elaborate theory of linguistic communication. At the heart of this theory is the
rejection of the challenge’s key assumption that successfully communicating
speakers have to share an understanding of the linguistic performances exchanged.
Instead, Brandom proposes, successfully communicating speakers have to keep
track with how each interlocutor separately understands the sentences exchanged:
As long as there are differences in the collateral set of commitments with
respect to which the content of the claim expressed by a sentence needs to be
assessed, the sentence in one mouth means something different from what that
12 Brandom usually articulates this challenge in terms of differences in acknowledged ‘collateral
commitments’ or ‘auxiliary hypotheses’ across speakers, that is, in terms of differences in the sets of
assertoric sentences that the speakers also endorse (differences in their backgrounds of acknowledged
assertional commitments; cf. e.g. the quote in the next section, and Brandom (2002, pp. 98–102))—apparently
assuming that differences in such acknowledge collateral commitments imply differences in linguistic
understanding. Yet this assumption is false. Brandom’s theory allows that two speakers who acknowledge
vastly different sets of assertional commitments nonetheless acknowledge the very same sets of substitutional
commitments, and thus strictly speaking share an understanding of the term-tokens making up their linguistic
performances. Consider the following simplified scenario: Speaker A assents to the two sentences ‘Fa’ and
‘Ga’ and acknowledges an inference from ‘Fa’ to ‘Ga’ (but not vice versa) whereas B assents to ‘Fb’ and ‘Gb’
and acknowledges an inference from ‘Fb’ to ‘Gb’ (but not vice versa). A and B thus acknowledge different
assertional commitments (to ‘Fa’ and ‘Ga’ vs. ‘Fb’ and ‘Gb’ respectively) and different inferential
commitments (from ‘Fa’ to ‘Ga’ vs. ‘Fb’ to ‘Gb’ respectively). However, they may understand the terms ‘F’
and ‘G’ in exactly the same way, by acknowledging just the substitutional commitment according to which
every two sentences ‘___F___’ and ‘___G___’ (where ‘F’ and ‘G’ may occur several times in the respective
sentences), such that (a) the latter sentence may be generated from the former in a single step by substituting ‘G’
for any occurrence(s) of ‘F’, and (b) the substitution(s) take(s) place in extensional context, are in relation of
valid material inference. Thus, instead of articulating Fodor’s and LePore’s challenge in terms of differences in
auxiliary hypotheses, it is better to articulate it directly in terms of differences in acknowledged substitutional
commitments, which can be expected to pervade discourse independently anyway.
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same sentence means in another mouth. So even in the smooth untroubled case
of communication, if you want to understand what I say, you have to be able to
associate with it a sentence that in your mouth expresses the claim that the
sentence I uttered expresses in mine. For your understanding it (your knowing
what I have committed myself to) involves your being able to trace out the
inferences that claim is involved in… in order to know what I am committing
myself to. This means knowing… what claims its endorsement would
preclude you, as well as me, from being entitled to, and so on. Apart from that
capacity, you cannot extract information from what I say and cannot be said to
understand it. (Brandom 1994, p. 510, cf. as well ibid., pp. 513, 586–601)
The idea here is that each successfully communicating speaker tracks, implicitly in
practice, each interlocutor’s linguistic understanding of the terms in use separately.
In practice, each speaker keeps ‘‘separate books’’—one book for each interlocutor—
recording each interlocutor’s acknowledged substitutional commitments regarding
these terms. Due to this cognitive activity of separate bookkeeping, the participants
can be said to understand each other—each knows how every interlocutor
understands the statements exchanged—and hence to communicate successfully,
despite their differences in linguistic understanding. Brandom calls this cognitive
activity of separate bookkeeping scorekeeping.13
(VII) This brings us back to the de re–de dicto contrast. One reason for the
significance of the contrast, according to Brandom, is that de re and de dicto
ascriptions make explicit different aspects of this otherwise implicit scorekeeping
activity14:
The suggestion is that the expressive function of de re ascriptions of
propositional attitude is to make explicit which aspects of what is said express
substitutional commitments that are being attributed [by the ascriber to the
ascribee as acknowledged] and which express substitutional commitments that
are undertaken [i.e. acknowledged by the ascriber herself]. The part of the
content specification that appears within the de dicto ‘that’ clause is limited to
what, according to the ascriber, the one to whom the commitment is ascribed
would… acknowledge as an expression of what that individual is committed
to. The part of the content specification that appears within the scope of the de
re ‘of’ includes what, according to the ascriber of the commitment, but not
necessarily according to the one to whom it is ascribed, is acknowledged as an
expression of what the target of the ascription is committed to. (Brandom
1994, pp. 505–506. Cf. as well Brandom 2002, pp. 96–102; 2007,
pp. 667–670)
This doctrine is my target. According to it, the chief discursive role of de re and de
dicto belief ascriptions is that they allow us to articulate different aspects of our
13 The term is David Lewis’ (cf. Lewis 1979). Yet Lewis and Brandom fill it with different content.
14 Another reason for this significance, according to Brandom, is that the de re–de dicto contrast yields an
account of the representational dimension of thought and talk.
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otherwise implicit scorekeeping activity, and thus to make our differences in
linguistic understanding themselves the explicit topic of the conversation. We
interpret the oblique occurrences of terms in de dicto ascriptions not in accordance
with our own acknowledged substitutional commitment, but rather in accordance
with the substitutional commitments we take the ascribee to acknowledge. In this
sense, de dicto ascriptions, so interpreted, make explicit how we take the ascribee to
understand these terms. On the other hand, we interpret the transparent occurrences
of the same terms in the corresponding de re ascriptions—reached from the original
de dicto ascriptions by exporting these terms into transparent position—in
accordance with our own acknowledged substitutional commitments regarding
these terms. In this sense, these de re ascriptions, so interpreted, make explicit our
own understanding of these terms. Thus by alternately ascribing a belief de re and
de dicto, we convey how we ourselves, and how, according to us, the ascribee,
understands the relevant terms.
For example, suppose that you do, and Jones does not, take water to be H2O.
According to Brandom, this means that you do, and Jones does not, acknowledge a
symmetric substitution-inferential commitment regarding ‘water’ and ‘H2O’, that is,
a substitution-inferential commitment from ‘water’ to ‘H2O’ and another one from
‘H2O’ to ‘water’. Suppose, moreover, that you know about this difference between
yourself and Jones, that is, that the score you keep on Jones has registered it.
Accordingly, you will interpret the oblique occurrence of ‘water’ in the de dicto
ascription (2) based on Jones’ deviating acknowledged substitutional commitments
regarding ‘water’, as registered by your score, thus displaying Jones’ understanding
of the term. And you will interpret the transparent occurrence of ‘water’ in the
corresponding de re ascription (3) based on your own acknowledged substitutional
commitments regarding ‘water’, thus displaying your own understanding of the
term.
(VIII) Let’s pause for two comments. First, corresponding to the distinction
between the normative status of being substitutionally committed by accepting a
statement—being bound by the corresponding substitution norms—and the
normative attitude of acknowledging certain substitutional commitments in
accepting a statement we have a distinction between two senses of ‘belief’:
According to one usage [of ‘belief’], I believe only what I think I believe, what
I take myself to believe. I do not believe things behind my back; my sincere
avowals are authoritative with respect to what I believe. According to another
usage, however, I believe the consequences of my beliefs, whether I think I do
or not. For my acknowledged beliefs can commit me to more than I
acknowledge…. There can be tensions between these two ways of talking
about beliefs: a narrow one tied to empirical dispositions to avow, the other
more normative and expansive, closing beliefs under a consequence relation
not limited by the believer’s acknowledgement of it. (Brandom 1994, p. 507)
In one sense, what I believe by accepting a statement is delineated by what I’m
prepared to acknowledge as consequences of the statement—hence by what I take to
be the substitution inferential role of the statement, that is, by my acknowledged
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substitutional commitments regarding the terms in it. When taken in this sense, my
belief thus plays a certain causal role in my cognitive etiology—since acknowl-
edged substitutional commitments are part of the natural, causal order. In another
sense, what I believe by accepting the statement is determined by the consequences
I’m bound to acknowledge regarding the statement—hence by the substitutional
commitments I objectively adopt when accepting the statement, whether or not I
acknowledge them. In this sense, what I believe by accepting the statement plays a
certain normative role in my cognitive life: it sets standards for assessing the
proprieties of my linguistic and non-linguistic behavior.
Given Brandom’s theory of belief ascriptions, the de re–de dicto contrast reflects
this distinction between the two senses of ‘belief’ from an ascriber’s point of view
(e.g. Brandom 1994, pp. 507–508; 2007, pp. 669–670). Since the obliquely
occurring terms in a de dicto ascription to another person,15 as interpreted by the
ascriber, capture what the ascriber takes to be the ascribee’s acknowledged
substitutional commitments, and since acknowledged substitutional commitments
are part of the natural, causal order, the de dicto ascription as a whole, thus
interpreted, captures what the ascriber takes to be the causal role of the belief
ascribed in the ascribee’s cognitive life. It captures from the ascriber’s point of view
which inferences the ascribee is disposed to draw and which statements he is
disposed to reject, given the belief ascribed. The correlative de re ascriptions to the
same person, on the other hand, capture from the ascriber’s point of view part of the
normative significance of the belief ascribed, that is, they capture some of the
substitutional commitments that the ascriber takes the ascribee to be bound to
acknowledge, given the belief ascribed. The transparently occurring terms in the de
re ascription, as interpreted by the ascriber, reflect the ascriber’s own acknowledged
substitutional commitments, hence what the ascriber takes to be the objective
substitutional norms governing these terms. And since objective norms bind
everybody, hence the ascribee in particular, the de re ascription as a whole, so
interpreted, thus captures substitutional commitments (regarding these transparently
occurring terms) that, according to the ascriber, the ascribee is bound to
acknowledge given the belief ascribed—whether or not the ascribee acknowledges
them in fact.
For example, the de dicto ascription (2), as interpreted by you, captures the belief
ascribed to Jones as disposing Jones to de facto reject the inference from ‘Water
quenches thirst immediately’ to ‘H2O quenches thirst immediately’, hence as
playing in this regard a certain causal role. After all, your interpretation of the
oblique occurrence of ‘water’ in (2) reflects Jones’ failure to acknowledge a
substitution-inferential commitment from ‘water’ to ‘H2O’, and it thus captures the
belief ascribed as one that would not prompt Jones to, for example, endorse the
statement ‘H2O, quenches thirst immediately’. On the other hand, the corresponding
de re ascription (3), as interpreted by you, displays the belief ascribed to Jones as
involving certain normative statuses—in particular, as obliging Jones to, among
15 De dicto and de re self-ascriptions of beliefs do not bring out this contrast since, in this case, the
ascriber’s acknowledged substitutional commitments are the ascribee’s.
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other, acknowledge as valid the inference from this belief to ‘H2O quenches thirst
immediately’. After all, your interpretation of the transparent occurrence of ‘water’
in (3) reflects among other your own acknowledged substitution-inferential
commitment from ‘water’ to ‘H2O’, which you take to reflect an objective
substitution norms governing these terms, and thus a norm that, according to you,
binds Jones as well.
Second, this distinction between the two senses of the term ‘belief’ does not
reflect a distinction between different kinds of belief, and in particular not between
different kinds of content, according to Brandom, but a distinction between different
perspectives on a single belief:
the de dicto ascription of a belief that U(t) and the de re ascription of a belief
of t0 that U(it) are not ascriptions of different beliefs. They do not ascribe
beliefs with different contents. Rather, they specify the single conceptual
content of a single belief in two different ways, from two different
perspectives, in two different contexts of auxiliary commitments. (Brandom
2002, pp. 101–102. Cf. as well Brandom 1994, pp. 503, 584, 590–601.)
According to this doctrine, the ascriptions (2) and (3), for example, both ascribe the
same belief to Jones. In particular, they individuate the same belief content,
although from different perspectives of linguistic understanding. The de dicto
ascription (2) captures what the ascriber takes to be Jones’ grasp of that content,
whereas the de re ascription (3) displays in part the ascriber’s own grasp of the same
content. Let’s call this doctrine, that de dicto ascriptions and their correlative de re
ascriptions all individuate the same belief, and in particular the same content—
though from different perspectives of linguistic understanding—the Perspectival
Content Doctrine, or PCD.16
(IX) Let’s turn to Burge’s early (1979) argument for social externalism. Briefly,
the argument runs as follows. Take Bert, a fictitious English-speaking medical
layperson with arthritis. Bert has many true beliefs about arthritis: that he has it in
his joints, that it is painful, that he has had it for many years, etc. Moreover, Bert is
able to use the term ‘arthritis’ correctly under many discursive circumstances. Yet
Bert falsely believes of arthritis that it may strike joints and thighs and that it has
spread to his thighs. When Bert expresses this belief to his doctor, the doctor
instructs him at time t that arthritis may strike the joints only, and Bert immediately
gives up these false beliefs and defers to the doctor. Still, intuitively, the de dicto
ascription
16 Note that PCD implies that the occurrences of ‘water’ in (2) and (3) are recurrences of the same term,
hence that they do not even to you reflect a semantic ambiguity of the English term ‘water’—even though
you interpret these two occurrences differently. Brandom defends this implication at length in terms of a
sophisticated theory of anaphora. According to this theory, you treat the two occurrences of ‘water’ in (2)
and (3) as anaphorically linked to each other (in Brandom’s technical sense of anaphora), and therefore as
recurrences of the same term, despite the variance in your interpretations of these occurrences (cf.
Brandom 1994, Chaps. 7 and 8). Note also that PCD applies whether or not the ascriber acknowledges a
symmetric substitution-inferential commitment regarding ‘water’ and ‘H2O’. In either case, (2) and (3)
ascribe the same belief—with the same content—to Jones, yet from different perspectives of linguistic
understanding.
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(7) Bert believes (prior to t) that he has arthritis in his thighs
is true.
Next, Burge considers a twin-earth situation with a duplicate of Bert, Twert.
Bert’s and Twert’s respective internal physical, behavioral, and phenomenal
histories are type-identical up until t, as are much of their respective social
environments, except that the medical experts in Twerts community use the term
‘arthritis’ unambiguously to classify the ailment afflicting Twert’s joints as one that
may also afflict the thighs. Thus, when Twert tells his doctor that the ailment he
calls ‘arthritis’ may have spread to his thighs, the doctor is apprehensive (at t) and
Twert continues to have the belief expressed. Crucially, despite Bert’s and Twert’s
internal type identity up until t, the English de dicto ascription
(8) Twert believes (prior to t) that he has arthritis in his thighs
is intuitively false. Given the different expert uses of ‘arthritis’ in Bert’s and Twert’s
respective communities and Bert’s and Twert’s deference to their respective
experts, as well as given the apparent fact that, while Bert’s crucial belief
contradicts his doctor’s at t, Twert’s doctor potentially shares Twert’s expressed
belief at t,17 Bert (and his doctor) have, and Twert (and his doctor) lack, the concept,
or notion, arthritis. Accordingly, Bert’s and Twert’s expressed beliefs just prior to
t differ in content. Whereas the concept arthritis partially constitutes the content of
Bert’s belief, a different concept—tharthritis (say) –constitutes the content of
Twert’s. That is, while (8) is false, the de dicto ascription
(9) Twert believes (prior to t) that he has tharthritis in his thighs
is true.
(X) Yet given Bert’s and Twerts internal physical, behavioral, phenomenolog-
ical, etc. type-identity prior to t it follows that the beliefs ascribed by (7) to Bert and
(9) to Twert are neither reducible to, nor narrowly supervenient on, states internal to
Bert and Twert. Social factors external to Bert’s and Twert’s skin partially
constitute the respective contents of these beliefs. On the other hand, states and
events internal to Bert and Twert plausibly suffice to causally determine Bert’s and
Twert’s intentional behavior—the behavior that their intentions to act appear to
control. If so, Burge’s social externalist conclusion yields the corollary that neither
Bert’s arthritis beliefs and Twerts tharthritis beliefs nor, contrary to how it appears,
Bert’s arthritis intentions and Twert’s tharthritis intentions ever contribute to the
causal determination of Bert’s and Twert’s respective intentional behaviors. Hence,
no good psychological explanation should invoke these beliefs and intentions.
Yet this corollary seems unacceptable.
(XI) The vast majority of commentators interpret Burge’s (1979) argument as
based on two crucial assumptions, about the conditions of concept possession and
the semantics of belief ascriptions respectively. First, the argument is taken to
assume that a subject may grasp a concept C, and take the belief attitude towards a
17 Cf. for this point Kimbrough (1998, pp. 472–473).
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content in which C figures, even if she has an incomplete or deviant grasp of C. For
example, although prior to t Bert has a deviant grasp of arthritis, hence of the
content that he [Bert] has arthritis in his joints, as his deviating use of ‘arthritis’
prior to t makes plain, he nonetheless takes the belief attitude towards that content
prior to t. Call this the coarse-grained content assumption, or CGC. According to
CGC, two subjects may have beliefs with the same content although their respective
grasps of that content differ.
Second, the argument is taken to assume that oblique occurrences of terms in de
dicto belief ascriptions represent the content of the beliefs ascribed as constituted by
the very concepts that transparent occurrences of these terms express, but do per se
not display the ascribee’s grasp of these concepts. Call this the same semantic
profile assumption, or SSP.18 According to SSP, the oblique occurrence of ‘arthritis’
in the de dicto ascription
(10) Bert believes (prior to t) that he has arthritis in his joints
represents the content of the belief ascribed as constituted by the concept arthritis,
which is the very concept that the transparent occurrence of ‘arthritis’ in, say, the de
re ascription
(11) Bert believes (prior to t) of arthritis that he has it in his joints
expresses. Yet (10) does per se not represent Bert’s deviating grasp (prior to t) of the
content that he has arthritis in his joints.19
SSP concerns the semantics of belief ascriptions in abstraction from our ordinary
practice of interpreting them. Yet, clearly, Burge’s argument also assumes an
extension of SSP to the level of this practice. According to this extension, our
ordinary interpretations of oblique occurrences of terms in de dicto ascriptions
display the content of the beliefs ascribed as constituted by the very concepts that
we take transparent occurrences of these terms to express, but do (cursive) per se
not capture what we take to be the ascribee’s grasp of these concepts—not even if
we know independently how the ascribee grasps these concepts. For example, after
having been instructed about arthritis and exposed to the tale of Bert, we interpret
18 I owe the term to Sandy Goldberg (in conversation). Burge himself endorses SSP in its Fregean guise,
identifying concepts with Fregean senses (broadly speaking) and assuming that the referent of a term in
oblique position is the sense that transparent occurrences of the term have. However, SSP is compatible
with a Russellian identification of concepts with extensions (individuals and properties) (cf. Kimbrough
1998, p. 475).
19 ‘‘The relevant attributions… need not display the subject’s error. They may be attributions of a true
content. We can begin with a propositional attitude that involved the misconceived notion, but in a true,
unproblematic application of it [such as (10)]’’ (Burge 1979, p. 82). This passage confirms that, according
to Burge, de dicto belief ascriptions such as (10) do not display the ascribee’s faulty grasp of the content
ascribed—not even implicitly, nor even if the ascriber knows the ascribee’s error—and that the chief way
for an ascriber to display the error is via true ascriptions of beliefs whose content as a whole, as captured
by the ascription’s entire that-clause, explicitly displays the error (and is therefore false). For example, the
true ascription (7) displays Bert’s error because its entire that-clause explicitly captures Bert’s mistaken
identification of arthritis with ailments in the thighs, not because the oblique occurrence of ‘arthritis’ in
(7) per se implicitly captures (what Brandom would call) Bert’s faulty acknowledged substitution-
inferential commitment to ‘ailment in joints and thighs’ (cf. Sect. XXI).
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the oblique occurrence of ‘arthritis’ in (10) as imputing to Bert what we take to be
the concept arthritis—which we know to be true of certain ailments in the joints and
false of any ailment in the thighs—and (10) as a whole as representing Bert to have
a belief involving this concept. But our interpretation of the oblique occurrence of
‘arthritis’ in (10) does per se not capture Bert’s deviating grasp of arthritis, even
though we know independently of Bert’s deviating grasp. Instead, it reflects our own
more or less accurate grasp of arthritis, just as transparent occurrences of ‘arthritis’
do.
CGC and (the extension of) SSP are crucial for giving rise to the corollary. What
determines Bert’s intentional behavior in arthritis-related matters is his idiosyncratic
grasp of the concept arthritis—the sum total of his propensities to (mis)apply this
concept to various token ailments, to employ it in various true or false general
arthritis beliefs, to draw various valid or invalid inferences involving it, to
acknowledge various obtaining or non-obtaining incompatibilities based on it, etc.
Thus, if (10), as interpreted by us in accordance with the extension of SSP, imputes
what we take to be the concept arthritis to Bert, and is true of Bert—which is what
CGC allows—yet fails to capture Bert’s idiosyncratic grasp of this concept (it only
reflects our own grasp of it), (10) fails to capture the psychological state it correctly
ascribes to Bert as playing a causal role in the determination of Bert’s intentional
arthritis-related behavior. As ascribed, this state is no such determinant.
(XII) Importantly, most commentators on Burge’s (1979) argument—supporters
as well as critics—agree that (the extension of) SSP is both correct and theoretically
innocent, that is, that it accurately describes, independently of controversial
theoretical assumptions, our ordinary practice of interpreting belief ascriptions and
our usual intuitions about their meaning.20 To be sure, supporters of Burge’s (1979)
argument occasionally offer justification for this interpretive practice. For example,
Burge himself argues that a general practice of reinterpreting oblique occurrences of
terms in de dicto ascriptions, for the sake of capturing the ascribee’s idiosyncratic
grasp of concepts, would ‘‘proliferate terminology without evident theoretical
reward’’ (Burge 1979, p. 94)—evidently assuming that such reinterpretation would
always require the introduction of new terms. However, such justification is not
meant to guide or correct our ordinary interpretive practice, but merely to vindicate
what we always already do, regardless of justification.
Given this wide-spread agreement regarding SSP, the debate concerning Burge’s
(1979) argument and its supposed corollary largely focuses on CGC, that is, on
whether, for instance, the ascription (10), interpreted in accordance with (the
extension of) SSP by us (who know that arthritis does not strike the thighs), is true
20 Critics of SSP include Loar (1988), Bach (1988), and Patterson (1990). However, Loar explicitly
agrees that we interpret ascriptions such as (7) and (10) in accordance with SSP, and merely argues that
common sense psychological explanations individuate beliefs internalistically and by their psychological
roles, rather than via de dicto ascriptions (interpreted in accordance with SSP). And Bach (1988) and
Patterson (1990) agree that SSP reflects our ordinary interpretive practice in most cases, including, it
seems, (7) and (10). They merely argue, focusing on other cases (conjured up in Burge’s revised (1986a)
argument, in the case of Bach) that we sometimes do not interpret de dicto ascriptions in accordance with
SSP. For discussion cf. Goldberg (2002).
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despite Bert’s idiosyncratic use of ‘arthritis’ prior to t. One side argues that (10), so
interpreted, is false. Members of this camp usually reject CGC, regard Burge’s
argument for externalism as unsound, and mainly grapple with accounting for the
mismatch between (10), so interpreted, and the belief, if any, ascribed to Bert.21 The
other side maintains that (10), so interpreted, is true. Members of this camp usually
accept CGC, regard Burge’s argument for semantic externalism as sound, and
mainly grapple with domesticating the apparently untenable corollary.22
(XIII) Let’s assess Burge’s argument from the perspective of Brandom’s theory.
Brandom accepts CGC. This follows from his theory of belief ascriptions plus his
commitment to PCD. To see so, consider the de dicto ascriptions
(12) Bert believes (prior to t) that arthritis afflicts the joints
and
(13) Bert’s doctor believes (prior to t) that arthritis afflicts the joints
as interpreted by some idealized scorekeeper, whose score accurately captures all of
Bert’s and all of Bert’s doctor’s respective acknowledged substitutional commit-
ments regarding ‘arthritis’ at the moment prior to t. (The idealization isn’t crucial
for my argument, but it drives the point home more perspicuously.) According to
Brandom, both ascriptions, as interpreted by this scorekeeper, are true.23 Moreover,
each ascription accurately captures via its oblique occurrences of ‘arthritis’, Bert’s
and the doctor’s respective grasps of arthritis, hence their respective acknowledged
21 This group divides into two camps. Members of the radical camp argue that the implications of
externalism show that folk psychology in general, and the belief ascription (7) (interpreted in accordance
with the extension of SSP) in particular, has a profoundly mistaken ontology. There are no beliefs, a
fortiori no externally constituted beliefs. The only correct psychology is a scientific revision of common
sense psychology, which quantifies exclusively over internal mental states (cf. e.g. Stich 1978, 1983).
Members of the moderate camp accept that folk psychology has no profoundly mistaken ontology. There
are indeed beliefs. However, ascriptions such as (7), interpreted in accordance with (the extension of)
SSP, misrepresent to some extent the content of the beliefs ascribed and are therefore strictly speaking
false. Concepts, such as Bert’s and the medical experts’ arthritis concepts, are ideolectical—they are
conceptions—yet massively overlapping in the relevant respects, which is why we communicate
successfully anyway. Since Burge’s argument depends on CGC—the assumption that concepts are strictly
speaking shared even if they are grasped in different ways—the argument is unsound and there is no
social externalist threat to (folk) psychological explanation (e.g. Segal 2000, pp. 122–126; Bilgrami 1992,
pp. 73–81).
22 This group too divides into two camps. The first camp (which includes Burge himself) argues that
externally constituted beliefs do cause intentional behavior after all (e.g. Burge 1986b, 1995). Proponents
of information theoretic accounts of content belong, in a sense, into this camp too, although their account
is more a response to Putnam’s different argument in support of (natural) externalism (e.g. Dretske 1993,
1995, Chap. 5; Stalnaker 1989, 1990, 1993). The second camp, defending the variety of so-called two-
factor theories, denies this claim and argue that purely internal psychological states or factors, which are
either themselves propositional attitudes or states or factors akin in structure to propositional attitudes,
underlie externally constituted beliefs. And these underlying internal states or factors causally determine
behavior. If so, the fact that externally constituted beliefs cannot themselves determine behavior is of
minor significance (cf. for very different versions of this approach Fodor (1987, 1991), and Loar (1988)).
23 As are (12) and (13), as interpreted by us non-ideal scorekeepers who know the tale of Bert, according
to Brandom.
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substitutional commitments regarding the term just prior to t—including Bert’s
deviant one from ‘arthritis’ to ‘ailment striking joints and thighs’ and the doctor’s
correct one from ‘arthritis’ to ‘ailment striking the joints only’. Furthermore, the
correlative de re ascriptions
(14) Bert believes (prior to t) of arthritis that it afflicts the joints
and
(15) Bert’s doctor believes (prior to t) of arthritis that it afflicts the joints
as interpreted by the ideal scorekeeper, are true as well, according to Brandom.
Moreover, each captures from the idealized scorekeeper’s perspective part of the
normative statuses adopted in having the beliefs ascribed. The transparent
occurrences of ‘arthritis’ in (14) and (15), as interpreted by the ideal scorekeeper,
display the ideal scorekeeper’s own acknowledged substitutional commitments
regarding ‘arthritis’, hence what the ideal scorekeeper takes to be the substitution
norms governing ‘arthritis’—norms that, since they are objective, bind Bert and his
doctor as well—and from which not only Bert’s but also the doctor’s respective
acknowledged substitutional commitments presumably deviate to some extent.
(Suppose the ideal scorekeeper is, while Bert’s doctor is not, a leading expert in
rheumatologic ailments.) Still, given PCD, (12)–(15) all specify the same belief, and
in particular the same content (constituted in part by the single concept arthritis),
though from three different perspectives of linguistic understanding. Thus, Bert and
his doctor (as well as presumably the idealized scorekeeper) share that belief,
although their respective grasps of its content differ. In other words, CGC is true,
according to Brandom.
CGC commits Brandom to a version of semantic externalism, as he readily
admits (e.g. Brandom 1994, p. 632; Brandom 2000b, pp. 359–360). According to
Brandom, the constituents of the concepts arthritis and tharthritis are the objective
semantic norms governing the use of ‘arthritis’ among speakers of English and
Twenglish. Moreover, what constitutes Bert’s grasp of arthritis and Twert’s grasp of
tharthritis prior to t are, among other, their acknowledged substitutional commit-
ments regarding ‘arthritis’ prior to t. Yet Bert’s and Twert’s acknowledged
substitutional commitments per se (in abstraction from the semantic norms
governing ‘arthritis’ in Bert’s and Twert’s respective linguistic communities) are
indistinguishable prior to t: prior to t, Bert and Twert are disposed to use the word
‘arthritis’ in exactly the same ways and to behave with respect to tokens of arthritis
and tharthritis in exactly the same ways. Still, Bert grasps arthritis while Twert
grasps tharthritis, and the beliefs in which these concepts figure are, accordingly,
external to Bert and Twert.
Next, given PCD, Brandom’s theory accords with the first half of (the extension
of) SSP. Although we interpret oblique occurrences of terms in de dicto ascriptions
based on what we take to be the ascribees’ (as opposed to our own) acknowledged
substitutional commitments, we also interpret, given PDC, these oblique occur-
rences as displaying the content of the beliefs ascribed as constituted by the very
concepts that we take transparent occurrences of these terms to express. For
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example, although we—who know the tale of Bert and whose score kept on Bert
thus reflects Bert’s deviating acknowledged substitution-inferential commitment
from ‘arthritis’ to ‘ailment afflicting joints and thighs’—interpret the occurrence of
‘arthritis’ in the de dicto ascription (10) in accordance with Bert’s deviant
acknowledged substitution-inferential commitment, which we don’t acknowledge
ourselves, we also regard, given PCD, (10) and the correlative de re ascription (11)
as individuating the same belief content. In this sense, we interpret the oblique
occurrence of ‘arthritis’ in (10) as imputing to Bert the very concept arthritis that
we take the transparent occurrence of ‘arthritis’ in (11) to express.24
Yet, of course, Brandom’s theory is incompatible with the second half of (the
extension of) SSP—the assumption that our interpretations of oblique occurrences
of terms in a belief ascription do per se not capture the ascribee’s grasp of the
corresponding concepts. According to Brandom, we precisely interpret these
occurrences such that they capture (what we take to be) the ascribee’s grasp of these
concepts, that is, (what we take to be) his acknowledged substitutional commit-
ments, in accordance with our score. For example, according to Brandom’s theory,
once we are told the tale of Bert, our score registers Bert’s mistaken acknowledged
substitution-inferential commitment (prior to t) from ‘arthritis’ to ‘ailment in joints
and thighs’, and we interpret the oblique occurrence of ‘arthritis’ in (10)
accordingly. Hence, our interpretation of (10) not only imputes to Bert the concept
arthritis, but also captures Bert’s deviant grasp of arthritis.
(XIV) Intriguingly, due to this rejection of the second half of SSP, Burge’s
argument, when assessed from the perspective of Brandom’s theory, establishes
semantic externalism without the corollary. Due to this theory’s agreement with
CGC and the first half of SSP, the de dicto ascription (10), as interpreted by us,
correctly ascribes a belief with an externally constituted content to Bert. Yet (10), so
interpreted, also captures, due to Brandom’s rejection of the second half of SSP,
Bert’s idiosyncratic grasp of this content and in particular his crucial idiosyncratic
acknowledged substitution-inferential commitment regarding ‘arthritis’. Thus, since
acknowledged substitutional commitments are causal determinants of behavior,
(10), as interpreted by us, also displays Bert’s belief as a causal determinant of
Bert’s behavior, contra the corollary.
This seems to be an exciting, fresh perspective on Burge’s (1979) argument.
Brandom’s theory, if true, would allow us to accept the best aspects of the two
major response strategies to the argument while avoiding their difficulties. It would
allow us to stick with the intuition that de dicto ascriptions such as (7) and (10), as
24 However, PDC is obviously much stronger than the first half of SSP. For example, since according to
PDC de re ascriptions individuate complete propositional contents, PDC seems to imply something like a
Russellian identification of concepts with the referents of terms, while the first half of SSP is compatible
with a Fregean distinction between concepts (senses) and referents. Moreover, the first half of SSP does
not imply that de dicto ascriptions and their various de re counterparts all individuate the same belief. It
only implies, when combined with the Fregean view, that, say, (10) represents the belief ascribed to Bert
as involving the Fregean sense arthritis, while (11)—since it leaves open via which Fregean sense the
belief ascribed to Bert refers to arthritis—does not fully individuate the content of the belief ascribed to
Bert (cf. also Fn. 18).
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interpreted by us, are strictly speaking true—Bert has the beliefs (7) and (10)
ascribe to him—and to embrace externalism. That is, it would spare us from having
to grapple with any mismatches between (7) and (10), so interpreted, and the beliefs
(if any) ascribed to Bert. Yet it would also allow us to stick with the intuition that
these de dicto ascriptions figure in correct psychological explanations, since they
also reveal the beliefs ascribed as causal determinants of behavior. Hence
Brandom’s theory would spare us from having to grapple with the awkward
seeming corollary. Burge’s (1979) argument, when assessed from the perspective of
Brandom’s theory, simply does not yield this corollary.
Along the way, Brandom’s theory offers interesting replies to certain theoretical
worries that seemingly speak against rejecting the second half of (the extension of)
SSP—the crucial move that distinguishes this Brandomian reply to Burge’s
argument from other replies. Again, Burge justifies our interpretive practice in
accordance with the second half of SSP by arguing that reinterpreting oblique term-
occurrences in de dicto ascriptions such as to capture the ascribee’s idiosyncratic
grasp of concepts, would ‘‘proliferate terminology without evident theoretical
reward’’ (Burge 1979, p. 94). Yet, first, such reinterpretations do not proliferate
terminology, according to Brandom. In light of its intricacies—in particular its
sophisticated theory of anaphora—Brandom’s theory counts the oblique occurrence
of, say, ‘arthritis’ in the de dicto ascription (10) as a recurrence of the same English
term ‘arthritis’ that occurs transparently in the de re ascription (11), although we
interpret the two occurrences differently.25 Second, such reinterpretive practice
seems to offer rewards—though practical rather than theoretical ones—in that it
allows us to make explicit aspects of our otherwise implicit recognition of
differences in linguistic understanding, and thus to make such differences
themselves the topic of our conversations. This explicitating role, Brandom claims,
is a chief discursive function of de dicto and de re ascriptions.
(XV) Alas, while this response to Burge’s argument might be available if we
accept Brandom’s theory of the belief ascriptions in isolation, that is, as a theory of
interpretation for belief ascriptions apart from his doctrines of scorekeeping and the
expressive role of belief ascriptions in discourse, we should, for two broad reasons,
be skeptical about Brandom’s theory of belief ascriptions, when placed in the
context of these two core doctrines. First, if this theory in this context were true, the
falsehood of the second half of SSP and the non sequitur of the corollary should
spring right into our eyes and be largely uncontroversial among us. Yet in fact it
seems obvious, and it is largely uncontroversial, among us that the second half of
SSP is true and that Burge’s (1979) argument, together with further widely accepted
assumptions about mental causation, implies the corollary.26 Second, in the context
of these two doctrines, the discursive rewards of interpreting belief ascriptions in the
manner Brandom envisions, rather than in accordance with SSP, turn out to be, on
25 Cf. Fn. 16.
26 Again, the debate mainly focuses on whether Burge’s argument is sound—specifically, on whether
CGC is true—rather than on whether it is valid and whether it yields the corollary. Burge himself is
among the few who denies that the corollary follows from his argument (e.g. Burge 1995).
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closer examination, zero, and they give us therefore neither theoretical nor
prudential reasons to favor Brandom’s proposed interpretive practice over SSP.
Sections (XVI)–(XVIII) elaborate the former line of argument, Sects. (XIX)–(XXII)
the latter.
(XVI) Like all speakers of English, we commentators on Burge’s (1979)
argument keep score on other speakers of English, according to Brandom. In
particular, we keep score on fictitious English speakers such as Bert, which is why
we could in principle communicate successfully with them—as we undoubtedly
could.27 Moreover, we both acknowledge a substitution-inferential commitment
from ‘arthritis’ to ‘ailment striking the joints period’ and know, given our exposure
to the tale of Bert, that Bert acknowledges prior to t a different and (indeed)
incompatible one from ‘arthritis’ to ‘ailment striking joints and thighs’. According
to Brandom, our score registers this difference: our acknowledged substitution-
inferential commitment goes into the book we keep on ourselves while Bert’s
different one goes into the book we keep on Bert. Thus, Brandom’s theory predicts
that our interpretations of the de dicto ascriptions (7) and (10) and the de re
ascription (11) neatly reflect this difference: we interpret the oblique occurrence of
‘arthritis’ in (7) and (10) in accordance with Bert’s deviant acknowledged
substitution-inferential commitment and the transparent occurrence of ‘arthritis’
in (11) based on our own different acknowledged substitution-inferential commit-
ment. Hence it predicts that we will, after our exposure to the tale of Bert, not
interpret the occurrences of ‘arthritis’ in (7) and (10) in accordance with (the second
half of) SSP, but such that they capture Bert’s idiosyncratic grasp of arthritis.
Especially once it is emphasized to us that (7) and (10), by contrast to (11), are
already regimented and de dicto, these interpretations should force themselves upon
us, since they merely mirror an aspect of our otherwise implicit score. Accordingly,
Brandom’s theory predicts that, once the second half of SSP is pointed out to us as a
crucial assumption of Burge’s argument, we will, after brief reflection, firmly and
largely unanimously reject this assumption as misrepresenting our ordinary practice
of interpreting belief ascriptions.
Moreover, since it is uncontroversial that a speaker’s grasp of a concept—as
opposed to the concept itself—constitutes, among other, his propensities to apply
the concept in certain ways and hence is among the determinants of the speaker’s
linguistic and non-linguistic behavior, the non sequitur of the corollary should be
fairly obvious to us as well. Few of us should be inclined to take it very seriously.
Couched in Brandomian terms, it should be fairly uncontroversial among us that,
since our interpretations of ‘arthritis’ in (7) and (10) capture Bert’s acknowledged
substitutional commitments regarding ‘arthritis’, which are in the causal order, the
ascriptions (7) and (10), as interpreted by us, capture the belief ascribed to Bert as a
causal determinant of Bert’s linguistic and non-linguistic behavior.
27 Brandom emphasizes that his theory of scorekeeping cum belief ascriptions extends to our
interpretation of texts generally (e.g. Brandom 2002, Chap. 3). He has mainly philosophical texts in mind,
but his position clearly also includes fictitious conversations that someone narrates to us, and he would
surely not deny that we keep score on fictitious persons such as Bert.
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Yet, of course, these things are far from uncontroversial. Instead, what seems
initially obvious to us, and hard to reject even on reflection, is that the beliefs (7)
and (10) ascribe to Bert are not only external to Bert but also (given certain further,
natural, widely accepted assumptions about mental causation) inefficacious
regarding Bert’s intentional behavior. A little further reflection reveals that one
main reason for this impression is that we interpret oblique term-occurrences in de
dicto ascriptions such as (7) and (10) in accordance with (the extension of) SSP and,
more specifically, based on our own understanding of (transparent occurrences of)
these terms. And after still some further reflection, hardly anyone finds reasons for
challenging SSP or a need to spring to its defense. Instead, virtually everyone agrees
that (the extension of) SSP is a theoretically innocent, accurate description of our
practice to interpret de dicto ascriptions. In short, it seems that the alternative to (the
extension of) SSP Brandom’s theory provides is mistaken: it misrepresents our
ordinary practice of interpreting belief-talk in English.
(XVII) It may be objected that this attempt to rebut Brandom’s theory in light of
our response to Burge’s (1979) argument falsely assumes that Brandom must hold
that our interpretations of de re and de dicto ascriptions are by and large
accessible—epistemically internal—to us, in the sense that we usually can find out
what they are through reflection alone. Couldn’t Brandom hold that we are often
confused about our interpretive practice, in particular, that we think we interpret de
dicto ascriptions in accordance with (the extension of) SSP when in fact we interpret
them in accordance with his alternative?
Brandom neither does nor could easily hold this view. In general, although ease
of access to one’s own scorekeeping attitudes—one’s acknowledgements and
attributions of commitments—is presumably a matter of degree and context, and
although scorekeeping attitudes may occasionally be suppressed in the Freudian
sense, the bulk of the scorekeeping attitudes is epistemically internal, according to
Brandom. To re-quote, he says, apropos acknowledged substitutional commitments,
that ‘‘[a]ccording to one usage [of ‘belief’, viz. the de dicto usage], I believe only
what I think I believe, what I take myself to believe. I do not believe things behind
my back’’ (Brandom 1994, p. 507; cf. Sect. VII).28 Beliefs as ascribed by true de
dicto ascriptions are what the believer takes them to be. In particular, their contents
are what the believer takes them to be, that is, they are whatever substitutional
commitments the believer acknowledges regarding these beliefs: these takings are
‘not behind [the believer’s] back’—by which Brandom presumably means that they
28 Similarly: ‘‘De dicto specifications of the content of another’s thought depend on the inferences she is
disposed to draw from it: what she thinks she is committing and entitling herself to thereby’’ (Brandom
2007, p. 669; his emphases). ‘‘[E]ach ascriber draws those auxiliary hypotheses from the facts as she
takes them to be’’ (Brandom 2002, p. 101; his emphasis). ‘‘Looking at the other commitments an author
would acknowledge tells an interpreter what the author took it that she was committing herself to by
making a certain claim’’ (Brandom 2002, p. 96; his emphasis). ‘‘One engaged in this sort of [de dicto]
interpretation is trying to specify the contents of commitments in a way that would be recognized and
acknowledged as specifications of those contents by the one whose commitments they are’’ (Brandom
2002, p. 98; his emphases).
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are largely transparent to the believer.29 Of course, beliefs as ascribed by true de re
ascriptions, and in particular the substitutional commitments the believer really
adopts regarding these beliefs, as thus ascribed, are often largely beyond the
believer’s access through reflection alone, but his acknowledged commitments per
se are not.
This is also what Brandom should say. At the core of his project is the idea that
speakers are cognitively responsible for the commitments they acknowledge: due to
their acknowledged commitments, speakers are proper subjects of critical appraisal,
praise and blame, positive or negative sanctioning. Yet, notoriously, if speakers
were fated to be largely and systematically misguided about what they take
themselves to be committed to, or if such acknowledgements were largely sub-
personal and beyond reflective access, it would be difficult to see how it could be
proper to hold them responsible for them—a point that is familiar from debates on
epistemic externalism.30 Thus, since it is by and large proper to hold speakers
responsible for their acknowledged commitments, these acknowledgements should
be construed as largely accessible to the speaker.
Such accessibility extends to one’s attributions of commitments to others,
according to Brandom: a scorekeeper has by and large accurate access to what
commitments she takes others to acknowledge. Attributions of commitments are yet
again something the scorekeeper is responsible for: it can be proper to challenge a
scorekeeper’s attributions on the grounds that they inaccurately reflect the
commitments the other truly acknowledges (e.g. Brandom 1994, pp. 626–628).
However, if such attributions were by and large beyond the scorekeeper’s access, it
would yet again be hard to see how the scorekeeper could properly be held
accountable for them. Moreover, according to Brandom’s reliabilist theory of
empirical knowledge, an epistemic subject’s dispositions to reliably form certain
empirically contentful beliefs under certain perceptual circumstances justify, in an
emphatically normative sense, these beliefs. Yet since such dispositions are per se
naturalistic, and since their reliability is epistemically external to the subject, how
can they have this normative status? According to Brandom, they have this status
because actual and potential attributions of commitments to the epistemic subject by
other scorekeepers, together with other factors, confer such normativity upon them
(e.g. Brandom 1994, pp. 217–221; 2000a, pp. 117–122; 2011, pp. 130–132).
However, such attributions could not have this normativity-conferring power,
according to Brandom, if they were to the scorekeeper as epistemically external as
the reliability of these dispositions per se are epistemically external to the epistemic
29 Of course, Brandom has much latitude for accounting for this epistemically internal character of
acknowledged commitments. He obviously does not need to maintain that acknowledged commitments
are essentially phenomenally conscious, nor that one’s access to them is epistemically incorrigible in all
cases. Moreover, he does not need to commit himself to any specific theory about how such access is
achieved—except that such access cannot in general be a matter of explicit higher-order thought.
30 Thus, externalists about knowledge/justification usually deny that meeting certain standards of
cognitive responsibility is essential for possession of knowledge/justification, precisely because they deny
that whether an epistemic subject meets the conditions for knowing/being justified is epistemically
internal to the subject. For discussion cf. e.g. Prichard (2005, Chap. 7).
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subject. In sum, Brandom clearly does and should assumes that these attributions are
by and large accessible to the scorekeeper on reflection.31
Yet such accessibility must not suddenly vanish when the scorekeeper makes
aspects of them explicit via de re or de dicto ascriptions. More precisely, the
scorekeeper’s interpretations of transparent and oblique term-occurrences, reflecting
her acknowledgements and attributions of substitutional commitments, must
themselves by and large be accessible to her on reflection. After all, the purported
power of de re and de dicto ascriptions to make these scorekeeping attitudes explicit
consists in these interpretations of these term-occurrences based on these
scorekeeping attitudes. If these interpretations were largely ‘behind the score-
keeper’s back’, de re and de dicto belief ascriptions would be an unsuitable basis for
expressing and critically appraising the scorekeeper’s acknowledged and attributed
substitutional commitments.
Yet it follows from all this that our responses to Burge’s (1979) argument count
as evidence against Brandom’s theory of belief ascriptions. This theory predicts not
only that we will interpret, for example, the occurrences of ‘arthritis’ in (7) and (10)
in accordance with our attribution of the deviant acknowledged substitution-
inferential commitment from ‘arthritis’ to ‘ailment afflicting joints and thighs’ to
Bert, contra (the second half of) SSP, but also that we have access to this
interpretation. What is more, we should be able to access this particular
interpretation with special ease, since the very context—our exposure to Burge’s
(1979) argument—makes salient to us not only Bert’s deviant acknowledged
substitutional commitment from ‘arthritis’ to ‘ailments afflicting joints and thighs’
but also the fact that (7) and (10) are to be read de dicto. Thus, the fact that we so
unanimously take ourselves to interpret (7) and (10) in accordance with the second
half of SSP and, more specifically, based on our own understanding of (transparent
occurrences of) ‘arthritis’, indicates that Brandom’s theory provides a false picture
of our ordinary practice of interpreting belief ascriptions.
(XVIII) Could Brandom maintain that we should not understand his theory
descriptively, as an account of how we interpret de dicto ascriptions in fact, but
prescriptively, as an account of how we should interpret them for the sake of
avoiding certain philosophical problems? This response strategy would concede that
our ordinary interpretive practice accords with SSP and emphasize that this practice,
if left unexamined, raises philosophical problems such as the specter of the corollary
of externalism and the problem how, given semantic holism, we manage to
communicate successfully. It would then urge that since Brandom’s theory,
31 ‘‘[Epistemic r]eliabilism deserves to be called a form of epistemological externalism, because
assessments of reliability (and hence of knowledge) can turn on considerations external to the reasons
possessed by the candidate knower himself. In those cases, such assessments concern the reasons
possessed by the assessor of knowledge rather than by the subject of knowledge…. [T]hey should not
therefore be seen as external to the game of giving and asking for reasons’’ (Brandom 2000a, p. 120).
Passages such as these clearly commit Brandom to the view that assessments of reliability—which
involve attributions of commitments as acknowledged to epistemic subjects—are ‘possessed’ by the
assessor (the scorekeeper) in the sense of being epistemically internal to her. Because they are epistemic
internality to the scorekeeper, they are not external to the game of giving and asking for reasons, despite
being epistemically external to the epistemic subject.
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understood prescriptively, dissolves these problems, charity demands that we
understand his theory prescriptively.
This reply should, I think, be of general interest. Although most commentators
regard CGC as the more contentious assumption of Burge’s (1979) argument, some
have argued that we may at least sometimes interpret de dicto ascriptions roughly
along the lines Brandom suggests, and contended that, given these interpretations on
these occasions, a commitment to semantic externalism or the corollary (or both)
may be avoided.32 Surely, those who favor such a response strategy to Burge’s
(1979) argument, as well as those who wish to reject the corollary in general, should
take interest in Brandom’s theory and mine it for materials to bolster their case.
However, this reply is not open for Brandom himself, given the specifics of his
larger philosophical enterprise. A core claim of that enterprise is that our linguistic
understanding is in fact holistic and constituted by our acknowledged substitutional
commitments. Accordingly, Fodor’s and LePore’s challenge forces him to explain
the undisputed abundance of our communicative successes, and his theory of
scorekeeping cum belief ascriptions is his reply. We keep separate books of each
other’s acknowledged substitutional commitments implicitly in practice, thus
capturing each other’s varied linguistic understandings, and the central discursive
role of de dicto and de re belief ascriptions is to make aspects of this otherwise
implicit bookkeeping explicit. This explicitating role is vital for our discursive
practice, as it allows us to make, for the sake of communicative repair or for
hermeneutic purposes, our differences in linguistic understanding themselves the
topic of the conversation. However, de dicto and de re belief ascriptions can play
this explicitating role in our discourse only if we ordinarily interpret them in the way
Brandom proposes. If Brandom’s theory merely prescribed how we should interpret
them, while conceding that we usually do not follow this prescription, belief
ascriptions could not usually fulfill the primary discursive role his theory assigns to
them. Thus, Brandom must insist that his theory describes, and does not merely
prescribe, our ordinary practice of interpreting belief ascriptions.
(XIX) Yet, to turn to my second broad line of argument against Brandom’s
theory of belief ascriptions, do belief ascriptions really play their assigned
explicitating role well—assuming Brandom’s holism about linguistic understanding
and his theory of scorekeeping, and disregarding for argument’s sake the fact that
our responses to Burge’s argument support SSP? That is, do the alleged discursive
benefits of belief ascriptions in the context of Brandom’s overall project provide
reasons, internal to that project, for favoring his theory of belief ascriptions over (the
extension of) SSP? It turns out that they don’t. Belief ascriptions have on closer
inspection not even in that context the discursive benefits Brandom claims they
have. Accordingly, considerations about such benefits do not even in that context
provide reasons for favoring his theory of belief ascriptions over SSP.
To begin with, even according to Brandom’s theory, we often interpret de dicto
ascriptions in accordance with (the second half of) SSP. For example, we do so
whenever we ascribe beliefs de dicto to strangers and groups. Consider
32 E.g. Bach (1988), in response to Burge’s later (1986a) argument for social externalism.
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(16) Arsky believes that Bert has arthritis
and
(17) All physicians believe that arthritis strikes the joints only
Presumably, even according to Brandom’s theory, you will interpret the oblique
occurrences of ‘arthritis’ in (16) and (17) based on your own acknowledged
substitutional commitments regarding the term, in accordance with SSP.33 In case of
(16), you will do so simply because you know nothing about Arsky’s idiosyncratic
grasp of ‘arthritis’—Arsky is a stranger to you. In case of (17), you will do so even
if (what is impossible in practice) your score should neatly capture each physician’s
understanding of ‘arthritis’, because interpreting in accordance with (the union set
of) all physicians’ acknowledged substitutional commitments regarding ‘arthritis’
will yield no coherent interpretation—if, as is likely, at least two physicians’
understandings of ‘arthritis’ diverge in some respect. In general, even according to
Brandom’s theory, we usually interpret obliquely occurring terms in de dicto
ascriptions to strangers or groups based on our own acknowledged substitutional
commitments, in accordance with SSP.
Thus, de dicto ascriptions may play the envisioned discursive role—to make
explicit how the ascribee understands the obliquely occurring terms—only in some
cases. However, they turn out to be ill-suited to play this role even in these cases.
For example, suppose that my score captures Arsky’s understanding of ‘arthritis’
perfectly while your score is blank in this regard—Arsky is a stranger to you.
According to Brandom’s theory, we should expect that my utterance of (16) to you
under these circumstances reveals to you how Arsky understands ‘arthritis’ and thus
provides us with a basis for conversing about his understanding of the term. Yet, of
course, nothing like this happens. My utterance reveals to you that Arsky endorses
the proposition that Bert has arthritis. In this regard, my utterance is truly
informative to you. However, it leaves you in the dark about Arsky’s understanding
of ‘arthritis’. Even if Brandom’s theory is right (and SSP wrong), my utterance
expresses Arsky’s understanding only in the sense that my interpretation of
‘arthritis’ in my utterance captures Arsky’s understanding of the term. Yet my
utterance, so interpreted by me, leaves you (and any third person overhearing us)
clueless about how I interpret the occurrence of ‘arthritis’ in it. Thus, since I already
know how Arsky understands ‘arthritis’ and since you are left in the dark, my
utterance of (16) is useless in our discourse as an expression of Arsky’s
understanding of ‘arthritis’. Moreover, since you have nothing else to go by, you
must presumably yet again interpret the occurrence of ‘arthritis’ in my utterance
33 Alternatively, perhaps you will interpret ‘arthritis’ in (16) and (17) based on what you regard as
commonly acknowledged substitutional commitments regarding the term—if, say, you take your own
understanding of the term to be too idiosyncratic—or, in case of (17), based on one particular physician’s
understanding of the term, if the context makes special provisions. In any case, your interpretations of
(16) and (17) will not capture divergences in linguistic understanding in the way Brandom envisions.
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based on your own acknowledged substitutional commitments, in accordance with
SSP.34
(XX) The reasons why my utterance disappoints in playing the envisioned
discursive role are not far to seek. When Brandom claims (I re-quote) that ‘‘the
expressive function of de re ascriptions of propositional attitude is to make explicit
which aspects of what is said express substitutional commitments that are being
attributed [to the ascribee as acknowledged] and which express substitutional
commitments that are undertaken [i.e. acknowledged by the ascriber]’’ (Brandom
1994, p. 505) he seems to suggests that oblique versus transparent term-occurrences
in de dicto versus de re belief ascriptions ‘express’ attributed versus acknowledged
substitutional commitments in the sense of his doctrine of logical expressivism. If
this suggestion were correct, ascriptions such as my utterance of (16) should indeed
play their envisioned discursive role rather well. Yet this suggestion is not correct.
In general, according to Brandom’s doctrine of logical expressivism, the role of
logical vocabulary is to allow us to express—make explicit—in the form of claims
what we otherwise only do implicitly in practice. It allows us, in this sense, to codify
‘‘knowing how in the form of knowing that’’ (Brandom 2002, p. 8). Conditional
claims are Brandom’s paradigm case. We antecedently acknowledge in practice
inferential commitments concerning certain pairs of atomic sentences ‘S1’ and ‘S2’.
Through subsequent mastery of the conditional (a piece of logical vocabulary) we
may then express, in the sense of logical expressivism, these inferential commit-
ments themselves in the form of conditional claims—claims to the effect that if S1
then S2—thus making these inferential commitments themselves the common topic
of a conversation.35 For example, if I express my acknowledged inferential
commitment from ‘Bert has arthritis’ to ‘Bert has an ailment afflicting the joints’ to
you by asserting ‘If Bert has arthritis then he has an ailment afflicting the joints’, my
assertion amounts to the claim that Bert’s having arthritis implies Bert’s having an
ailment afflicting the joints, according to Brandom’s theory of the conditional. This
codification in the form of a claim allows you to pick up what is claimed—
regardless of your own antecedent take on the matter—and thus to acknowledge the
inferential commitment in question yourself in response, to ask me to back it up, to
challenge it, etc. (e.g. Brandom 2002, p. 60).
Given Brandom’s theory of scorekeeping, belief ascriptions are indeed expres-
sive in this sense, and Brandom is thus right to regard ‘believes that’ as a piece of
logical vocabulary (e.g. Brandom 1994, p. 530). Antecedently, a scorekeeper
34 Third persons whose score already comprises (mis)information regarding Arsky’s understanding of
‘arthritis’ will interpret my utterance based on their score, according to Brandom’s theory. However, they
too obviously learn nothing new in this regard from my utterance. Incidentally, my uttering (16) to you
under the circumstances arguably counts as an instance of miscommunication by Brandom’s own lights:
I interpret ‘arthritis’ in it in accordance with Arsky’s understanding of the term, you interpret it based on
your own understanding, while third persons interpret it in accordance with their own various scores on
Arsky. Thus, we understand my utterance in different ways and do, accordingly, miscommunicate—
unless each of us keeps not only score on Arsky but also score on how anyone else keeps score on Arsky.
35 Obviously, conditionals as expressions of (material) inferential relations are not conditionals as the
truth-functional devices of classical propositional logic—a point that Brandom is happy to concede (e.g.
Brandom 1994, pp. 111–116).
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attributes in practice to a linguistic peer, H, a commitment to make an assertion that
p (she attributes to H an assertional or doxastic commitment regarding p). Through
subsequent mastery of the locution ‘believes that’ she may then express, in the sense
of logical expressivism, this otherwise implicit attribution in the form of a claim—a
claim to the effect that H believes that p—thus making H’s assertional commitment
regarding p itself the common topic of the conversation.36 For example, my
assertion of (16) expresses the claim that Arsky believes (acknowledges a
commitment to assert) that Bert has arthritis, which allows you to pick up what
is claimed and thus to make this attribution to Arsky yourself in response, to ask me
to back it up, to challenge it, etc.
However, even if Brandom’s theory of belief ascriptions is true, performances of
de dicto belief ascriptions do not express, in the sense of logical expressivism, the
ascriber’s attributions of substitutional commitments as acknowledged to the
ascribee, that is, they do not in this sense make the ascribee’s linguistic
understanding explicit. They ‘‘express’’ these attributions only in the sense that
the ascriber interprets the oblique term-occurrences in accordance with these
attributions, but not also in the sense that they codify these attributions in the form of
claims. My utterance of (16), for instance, does not amount to a claim to the effect
that Arsky understands ‘arthritis’ such and so or that Arsky acknowledges such and
such substitutional commitments regarding ‘arthritis’, hence it fails to allow you to
pick up Arsky’s purported understanding of ‘arthritis’, to attribute to Arsky the
relevant substitutional commitments as acknowledged yourself in response, to ask
me to back up my claim, to challenge it, etc. Thus, since de dicto belief ascriptions,
as interpreted in accordance with Brandom’s theory, fail to express attributed
substitutional commitments in the form of claims, interpretation in this manner fails
to give belief ascriptions the discursive significance Brandom claims they have.
(XXI) This is not to say that, given Brandom’s semantic theory, we may not
sometimes via belief ascriptions make claims about an ascribee’s understanding of
certain terms. Consider
(18) Bert believes that arthritis is an ailment striking joints and thighs
and
(19) Bert believes that having arthritis implies having an ailment striking joints
and thighs
Given Brandom’s inferential role semantics, both ascriptions express (insinuate) in
the form of claims that Bert acknowledges a substitution-inferential commitment
from ‘arthritis’ to ‘ailment striking joints and thighs’. However, they do so not
because we interpret the oblique occurrences of these terms in (18) and (19) based
on what we take to be Bert’s acknowledged substitutional commitments, but rather
because, thanks to the workings of ‘believes that’ and the oblique occurrences of the
‘is’ of identity, existential quantification (‘an’), and ‘implies’, (18) and (19) as
36 Obviously, this view about the expressive function of belief-talk rests on controversial assumptions
about the relation between belief and assertion, which we need not to discuss here.
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wholes express (insinuate) in the form of claims that Bert acknowledges the
substitution-inferential commitment in question. And they do so even if we interpret
the oblique occurrences of ‘arthritis’ and ‘ailment striking joints and thighs’ in
accordance with SSP. Interpretation in accordance with Brandom’s theory
contributes yet again nothing to this expressive power of (18) and (19).
Note, however, that, given Brandom’s semantic theory, belief-talk is inessential
for expressing in the form of claims how someone understands certain terms. The
claims
(20) Bert understands ‘arthritis’ to mean an ailment striking joints and thighs
and, indeed,
(21) Bert acknowledges a substitution-inferential commitment from ‘arthritis’ to
‘ailment striking joints and thighs’
express the relevant aspect of Bert’s understanding of ‘arthritis’ just as well as (18)
and (19)—or even better—without ascribing belief. Moreover, interpreting the
quoted or unquoted occurrences of ‘arthritis’ and ‘ailment striking joints and thighs’
in (20) and (21) in accordance with what we take to be Bert’s understanding of the
terms, rather than SSP, obviously contributes yet again nothing to the expressive
power of (20) and (21).
(XXII) In conclusion, we thus see that the discursive benefits of interpreting
belief ascriptions in accordance with Brandom’s theory rather than SSP are nil even
in the context of Brandom’s inferential role semantics, his theory of scorekeeping,
and his theory of logical expressivism. Thus even this context gives us no reason to
favor his theory of belief ascription over SSP. Accordingly, since reflection on
Burge’s (1979) argument for social externalism and the responses to it in the
literature provides reason against this theory and in favor of (the extension of) SSP,
Brandom should drop the former and endorse the latter.
If Brandom endorses SSP, what are the implications for his overall project? With
respect to his theory of scorekeeping cum theory of expressing differences in
understanding, these implications are obviously significant. Brandom has to develop
a different strategy for squaring his holism about understanding with our manifold
communicative successes and our ability to make differences in understanding
explicit. That is, he either needs to develop a different theory of how we express
different aspects of our otherwise implicit score, or—more radically—revise his
theory of scorekeeping qua implicit, separate bookkeeping itself.37 However, these
37 For a listing of alternative strategies and brief arguments why they are unattractive, cf. Wanderer
(2008, pp. 147–151). One potentially promising strategy, which is not on Wanderer’s list, is to reject the
assumption that communicative success is a matter of shared, or sufficiently overlapping, or separately
tracked de facto linguistic understanding, but is instead a matter of shared recognition of various bits of
discourse as tokenings of the same term—hence of shared recognition that these bits ought to be
understood in the same way by everybody. On the one hand, the shared recognition of this obligation may
allow interlocutors to negotiate a shared partial understanding of the term, if so needed for achieving the
broader goals of the conversation. On the other hand, such shared recognition may per se suffice for
qualifying a conversation as successful.
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implications do not affect Brandom’s semantic project and its correlative theory of
linguistic understanding per se. Even if SSP enshrines our ordinary practice of
interpreting belief talk, the meaning of (non-logical, singular or general) terms may
still consist in the substitution norms governing use of these terms, in accordance
with Brandom’s inferential role semantics, and a speaker’s linguistic understanding
of these terms may still be a matter of acknowledging substitutional commitments.
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